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Why is humour so hard to understand? Rather like attempts to explain how music can 
move us, attempts to explain why things are funny seem doomed from the outset. 
Discussions of humour typically distinguish three kinds of theory: the incongruity 
theory (we are amused by the incongruous), the relief theory (humour is an expression 
of relief in difficult situations) and the superiority theory (we laugh to express our 
sense of superiority over others). In the face of genuine humour, theories like these 
can seem pedestrian and unconvincing. F.H. Buckley’s book is, unfortunately, no 
exception to this rule. Coming from the superiority camp, the book defends two theses 
about humour. (Professor Buckley’s own word is ‘laughter’, but it is clear that he is 
really interested in why we laugh rather than laughter itself.) The first is what he calls 
the ‘Positive’ thesis: that all humour is the expression of a sense of superiority over 
someone else, whom he names ‘the butt’. The second he calls the ‘Normative’ thesis: 
that those who laugh really are superior to the butt.  
 Neither thesis stands up to scrutiny. The Positive thesis has some initial 
plausibility, but it isn’t generally true. As Buckley’s examples show, a lot of humour 
does involve laughing at others; and often when we laugh at others, this can 
sometimes involve thinking of them as inferior. But this need not always be so. 
Mimicry and mockery among friends and families need not involve any belief in the 
inferiority of those who are its objects. When parents laugh at the things their young 
children say, it is absurd to suppose that this must be because they think the children 
are inferior in some way. Other examples abound. Buckley himself mentions puns and 
the absurd as potential counterexamples to his theory, and while perhaps they are not 
humour’s most refined manifestations, appreciation of these things can nonetheless be 
part of what it takes to have a good sense of humour. Buckley’s attempts to dismiss 
these counterexamples – in effect, by inventing a ‘butt’ for them or by saying that 
they are not really amusing – are not in the least convincing. 
 The Positive thesis, then, suffers the deficiencies of the other theories of 
humour: it is not true, since it only concentrates on one aspect of the comic. But at 
least it has some plausibility, unlike Buckley’s Normative thesis (‘the butt is truly an 
inferior person’). This idea only needs to be considered for a moment in order to see 
how silly it is. And Buckley himself drops it almost as quickly as he puts it forward, 
noting that ‘decidedly inferior people laugh’, so ‘the Normative thesis cannot be 
accepted without reservation’. But if the reservation is that the thesis isn’t true, then 
we shouldn’t accept it at all. Not only can inferior people laugh, but we can be wrong 
about who is inferior. The matter is barely worth discussing. 
 Buckley’s real interest, however, is not his Normative thesis, but the 
connection between the importance humour has in our lives and the question of how 
to live. This is what he calls the ‘morality of laughter’. The idea seems to be that 
humour is a good indicator of the presence of certain important virtues – the ‘social’ 
virtues of integrity, moderation, fortitude and temperance, and the character virtues of 
grace, taste and learning. To link his real interest here with his ostensible theme, 
Buckley calls these (rather confusingly) the ‘comic virtues’. He believes that we 
detect and refine our sense of these virtues, each occupying an Aristotelian mean 
between two vices, by noting what we find it natural to laugh at. Most of the book 
involves articulating this picture of the relationship between humour and the good 
life, illustrated on the way with a rather exhausting collection of examples from what 
sometimes seems like the entire canon of Western culture. 
Buckley is surely right about the centrality of humour in our lives, and its role 
in detecting and regulating what we value. But in tying his account of humour so 
closely to moral issues he is in danger of mimicking the attitude of the priggish and 
puritanical defenders of the politically correct who are his main target. Buckley 
complains about the tendency in for scholars in the humanities today to politicize 
every issue, even issues which do not lend themselves to it. This is worth saying, but 
Buckley himself comes close to committing a comparable academic sin: the tendency 
to moralise every issue. At one point he quotes approvingly a commentator on 
Aristotle who says that these days the question ‘how should one live?’ has been 
replaced by the question ‘how should one morally live?’ and that this is a regrettable 
narrowing of the concerns of earlier times. But Buckley does nothing to broaden the 
concerns: by focusing only on how our laughter targets the inferior, he reduces the 
role of humorous person to that of the supercilious arbiter of good morals and good 
taste. 
Buckley says that books about humour should be judged by one standard: 
whether they are funny. Despite the ebullient, well-read personality which emerges 
from these pages, it has to be concluded that if this is the standard, the book does not 
succeed. The bad signs are there in the opening pages, where the second example of a 
joke is one of Freud’s: ‘This girl reminds me of Dreyfus. The army does not believe 
in her innocence.’ Perhaps this was funny when Freud said it; but I challenge anyone 
to honestly say that they find it at all funny now. And this isn’t because it is immoral 
or in bad taste; it just isn’t funny. 
The fact that jokes can change from being funny to not being so is something 
which this study of humour, like many others, tends to ignore. But the key to 
understanding humour must somehow lie in the fact that whether something is funny 
depends not just on what is said, but essentially on who is saying it, how they say it, 
to whom they are saying it, and when and where they are saying it. It is unlikely that 
any decent theory of humour will get anywhere without taking into account this 
simple truth. It may be for this reason that drawing examples from the timeless 
classics of world literature is not going to be the best way of illustrating a thesis which 
really tries to get to the heart of what is funny. 
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